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Abstract—Cloud computing has the potential to provide low-
cost, scalable computing, but cloud security is a major area of
concern. Many organizations are therefore considering using a
combination of a secure internal cloud, along with (what they
perceive to be) less secure public clouds. However, this raises the
issue of how to partition applications across a set of clouds, while
meeting security requirements. Currently, this is usually done on
an ad-hoc basis, which is potentially error-prone, or for simplicity
the whole application is deployed on a single cloud, so removing
the possible performance and availability benefits of exploiting
multiple clouds within a single application. This paper describes
an alternative to ad-hoc approaches – a method that determines
all ways in which applications structured as workflows can be
partitioned over the set of available clouds such that security
requirements are met. The approach is based on a Multi-Level
Security model that extends Bell-LaPadula to encompass cloud
computing. This includes introducing workflow transformations
that are needed where data is communicated between clouds.
In specific cases these transformations can result in security
breaches, but the paper describes how these can be detected.
Once a set of valid options has been generated, a cost model is
used to rank them. The method has been implemented in a tool,
which is briefly described in the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is of growing interest due to its potential
for delivering cheap, scalable storage and processing. How-
ever, cloud security is a major area of concern that is restricting
its use for certain applications: “Data Confidentiality and
Auditability” is cited as one of the top ten obstacles to the
adoption of cloud computing in the influential Berkeley report
[1]. While security concerns are preventing some organizations
from adopting cloud computing at all, others are considering
using a combination of a secure internal “private” cloud, along
with (what they perceive to be) less secure “public” clouds.
Sensitive applications can then be deployed on a private cloud,
while those without security concerns can be deployed exter-
nally on a public cloud. However, there are problems with this
approach. Currently, the allocation of applications to clouds is
usually done on an ad-hoc, per-application basis, which is not
ideal as it lacks rigour and auditability. Further, decisions are
often made at the level of granularity of the whole application,
which is allocated entirely to either a public or private cloud
based on a judgment of its overall sensitivity. This eliminates
the potential benefits for partitioning an application across a set
of clouds, while still meeting its overall security requirements.
Fig. 1. An example medical data analysis workflow
For example, consider a medical research application in
which data from a set of patients’ heart rate monitors is
analyzed. A workflow used to analyze the data from each
patient is shown in Figure 1. The input data is a file with
a header identifying the patient, followed by a set of heart
rate measurements recorded over a period of time. A service
(Anonymize) strips off the header, leaving only the measure-
ments (this application is concerned with the overall results
from a cohort of patients, not with individuals). A second
service (Analyze) then analyzes the measurements, producing
a summary.
Analyzing the heart rate data is computationally expensive,
and would benefit from the cheap, scalable resources that are
available on public clouds. However, most organizations would
be unlikely to consider storing medical records on a public
cloud for confidentiality and, in some cases, legal reasons.
Therefore, one solution is to deploy the whole workflow on
a secure private cloud. However, this may overload the finite
resources of the private cloud, resulting in poor performance,
and potentially a negative impact on other applications.
An alternative solution is to partition the application be-
tween the private cloud, and an external public cloud in order
to exploit the strengths of both. This could be attempted in an
ad-hoc fashion by a security expert but, as we will describe,
there are challenges in working out the set of partitioning
options that still preserve the required security of data and
services. In this paper we therefore describe an alternative
to ad-hoc solutions – a method that takes an application
consisting of a set of services and data connected in a
workflow, and determines the valid set of deployments over
a set of clouds, ensuring that security requirements are met.
Although the paper is focused on workflows in which services
communicate through passing data, the method can be applied
to other types of distributed system that are composed of a set
of communicating components. The method is based on Multi-
Level Security models [2], specifically Bell-LaPadula [3]. The
result of the method is the complete set of options that meet the
organization’s security requirements for the application. The
method introduces transformations that need to be performed
on the workflows where data is communicated between clouds;
the paper identifies the security issues that can be raised as a
result, and the extra security checks that need to be performed
to address this. When the method results in more than one
valid partitioning option, there is the issue of how to choose
the best. The paper shows how a cost model can be introduced
to rank the valid options; a model based on price is defined,
and applied to the running medical workflow example. The full
method, including the cost model, has been implemented in a
tool that has been built to automate and explore its application.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives a
brief introduction to Multi-Level Security models and Bell-
LaPadula. It then describes how the Bell-LaPadula rules can
be applied to ensure that a workflow meets the security
requirements of its constituent services and data. The method
is then extended to cloud computing by assigning security
levels to clouds, and building on Bell-LaPadula to define a
method for determining if security requirements are met in a
particular deployment of the constituent parts of a workflow
onto a set of clouds. Section III then defines a method for
enumerating all valid options for deploying a workflow over a
set of clouds so as to meet security requirements. It highlights
the issues raised when data must flow between clouds, and
shows the workflow transformations and security checks that
must be included in the method if security to be guaranteed.
The result is a set of valid options; Section IV then introduces a
cost model that can be used to select the best option. Following
a review of related work (Section V) we draw conclusions and
outline further work.
II. METHOD
This section describes how the Bell-LaPadula security
model can be applied to workflows, and can then be extended
to the deployment of workflows on clouds. Through this
section, a workflow is modeled as a directed graph in which
services and data are represented as nodes. Services consume
zero or more data items and generate one or more data items;
the edges in the graph represent the data dependencies.
A. Representing Security Requirements
The Bell-LaPadula multi-level access control model [3] is
adopted, with services modeled as the subjects (S), and data
as the objects (O) [4]. The security model therefore consists
of the following:
• a set of actions (A) that subjects (S) can carry out on
objects (O). In the case of services operating on data
in a workflow, the actions are limited to read and write.
Therefore, the set of actions (A) is: A = {r, w}
• a poset of security levels: L
• a permissions matrix: M : S × O → A (the contents
of the matrix are determined by the workflow design;
i.e. if service s1 reads datum d0 then there will be an
entry in the matrix: s1× d0 → r ; similarly, if service s1
writes datum d2 then there will be an entry in the matrix:
s1 × d2 → w)
• an access matrix: B : S × O → A (this is determined
by the execution of the workflow: if there are no choice
points then it will equal the permissions matrix, however,
if there are choice points then it will equal a subset of
the permissions matrix corresponding to the path taken
through the workflow when it is executed.
• a clearance map: C : S → L
• a location map: l : S+O → L (this represents the security
level of each service and datum in the workflow)
In a typical Multi-Level Security scenario, the system moves
through a set of states, and the model can have different values
for permissions, access, clearance and location in each state.
However, here the execution of a workflow is modelled as
taking place within a single state. Normally a service would
be expected to have a clearance that is constant across all
uses of that service in workflows, however the location can
be chosen specifically for each workflow, or even (though less
likely) for each invocation of a workflow. However, the model
itself is general, and makes no assumptions on this.
The Bell-LaPadula model states that a system is secure with
respect to the above model if the following conditions are
satisfied ∀subjects u ∈ S and ∀objects i ∈ O
authorization: Bui ⊆Mui (1)
clearance: l(u) ≤ c(u) (2)
no-read-up: r ∈ Bui ⇒ c(u) ≥ l(i) (3)
no-write-down: w ∈ Bui ⇒ l(u) ≤ l(i) (4)
For workflows, the implications of these conditions are:
(1) all actions carried out by services must conform to
the permissions granted to those services
(2) a service can only operate at a security level (loca-
tion) that is less than or equal to its clearance
(3) a service cannot read data that is at a higher security
level than its own clearance
(4) a service cannot write data to a lower security level
than its own location.
For example, consider a service s1 which consumes datum
d0 and produces datum d2:
d0 → s1 → d2
(in these diagrams, the→ is used to show data dependency,
and each block – service or datum – is uniquely identified by
the subscript). The following rules must be met:
by (3)
c(s1) ≥ l(d0) (5)
and by (4)
Fig. 2. The relationship between security levels for a service that consumes
and produces data
l(d2) ≥ l(s1) (6)
The relationship between security levels is captured in
Figure 2. Arrows represent ≥ relationships.
Whilst assigning a security level to a datum in a workflow
is directly analogous to assigning a level to an object (e.g.
a document) in the standard Bell-LaPadula model, assigning
a security level to a service may be less intuitive. The
justification is that an organization may have differing levels of
confidence in the set of services they wish to use. For example,
they may be very confident that a service written in-house,
or provided by a trusted supplier, will not reveal the data it
consumes and produces to a third party either deliberately or
through poor design; in contrast, there is a risk that a service
downloaded from the Internet, of unknown provenance, may
do just that. Therefore, the organization can assign a high
security level to the former service, and a low level to the
latter.
For a specific workflow, when an organization’s security
experts are assigning locations to services, they may in some
cases chose to set the location below that of the clearance level
in order to allow a service to create data that is at a lower level
than its clearance level; i.e. so that the no write down rule
(4) is not violated. This may, for example, take place when
the expert knows that the output data will not be sensitive,
given the specific data that the service will consume as input
in this specific workflow. A concrete example would be a
service that summarizes textual data. This has been written
to a high standard, and the security expert is confident that it
will not leak data to a third party. Therefore, its clearance is
high. However, in one particular workflow it is known that this
service will only be used to summarise public data downloaded
from the World Wide Web, which is also where its output
will be published. Therefore, the security expert would set
the service’s location to an appropriately low level so that the
write down rule was not violated.
B. Cloud Security
This section describes how the Bell-LaPadula model, as
applied to workflows, can be extended to encompass cloud
computing.
Let us say that an organization wishes to run a particular
workflow. As more than one cloud is available, a decision must
be made as to where the data and services should be placed.
In current practice, it is typical that a security expert or system
administrator would just take a considered view on the overall
security level of the workflow, and that of the clouds on which
it could be deployed. For example, let us say that there are
two clouds, one a highly trusted private cloud contained within
the intranet of the organization, and the other a less trusted
public cloud. It may seem obvious in this case that a workflow
that operates on sensitive medical data should run only on the
internal cloud. Similarly, a workflow that summarises public
data could be deployed on the public cloud. However, there
are two problems with this approach. Firstly, it is informal,
being based on an expert’s judgment; a systematic approach
is preferable as it will give more consistent, defendable results.
Secondly, the approach deploys the whole of a workflow on a
single cloud. This rules out other options that may:
• reduce cost: for example by running less sensitive, but
computationally intensive, sub-parts of the workflow on a
public cloud if that avoids the need to purchase expensive
new servers so that the internal cloud can handle the extra
load
• increase reliability: for example by having the option to
run on a public cloud if the private cloud has an outage
• increase performance: for example by taking advantage
of the greater processing capacity of the public cloud for
the computationally intensive services in a workflow
Therefore, the rest of this section extends the security model
introduced earlier in order to allow systematic decisions to be
taken on where the services and data within a workflow may
be deployed to ensure security requirements are met.
To do this, the location map is extended to include clouds
which we denote by P (to avoid confusion with the C
conventionally used to denote the clearance map):
• location map: l : S +O + P → L
Also, H is added to represent the mapping from each service
and datum to a cloud:
H : S +O → P
We then add a rule that any block (service or datum) must
be deployed on a cloud that is at a location that is greater than
or equal to that of the block, e.g. for a block x on cloud y:
l(py) ≥ l(bx) (7)
Returning to the example service introduced in the previous
section:
d0 → s1 → d2
if, in H , d0 is on cloud pa, s1 on pb and d2 on cloud pc
then the following must be true:
l(pa) ≥ l(d0) (8)
l(pb) ≥ l(s1) (9)
l(pc) ≥ l(d2) (10)
This allows us to extend (6) to:
l(pc) ≥ l(d2) ≥ l(s1) (11)
The complete relationship between security levels for blocks
and clouds is captured in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The relationship between cloud and workflow block security levels
Location (l) Clearance (c)
d0 1
s1 0 1
d2 0
s3 0 0
d4 0
c0 0
c1 1
TABLE I
LOCATIONS AND CLEARANCES FOR THE MEDICAL ANALYSIS EXAMPLE
III. CALCULATING VALID DEPLOYMENT
OPTIONS
Using the above model and rules, it is now possible to
automatically enumerate all the valid deployment options for
a workflow. These are generated in two stages. Firstly, given
the following:
• the set of clouds P
• the set of services S
• the set of data O
• the map of security locations l
we can define the valid mappings of services and data onto
clouds, using rule (7):
V : S +O → P
V = {b→ p|b ∈ S +O, p ∈ P, l(b) ≤ l(p)}
To illustrate this, we use the medical workflow of Figure 1,
with two clouds. This has two services connected in a pipeline,
each with one datum as input and one as output:
d0 → s1 → d2 → s3 → d4
Table I shows an example location and clearance table (while
the scheme is general, this example uses only two security
levels: 0 and 1). Here, c1 is a private cloud, which is at a higher
security level than the public cloud c0. The patient data (d0) is
at the highest security level, while the other data is at the lower
level as it is not confidential. Service s1 is cleared to access
confidential data at level 1, but its location has been set to 0 in
this workflow so that it can produce non-confidential output at
level 0 without violating the Bell-LaPadula “no-write-down”
rule (4).
Based on this mapping of blocks and clouds to locations,
Table II then shows the possible valid placement of each block
onto the two clouds.
Block Cloud c0 Cloud c1
d0 •
s1 • •
d2 • •
s3 • •
d4 • •
TABLE II
VALID MAPPINGS OF BLOCKS TO CLOUDS
Having determined all valid mappings of services and data
to clouds, the set of all valid workflow deployments is given
by:
W : (S +O → P )− > {(S +O → P )}
= {w ∈ ||V ||,∀b ∈ S+O.∃p ∈ P.b→ p ∈ w, |w| = |S+O|}
Where ||V || is the power set of V and |w| is the cardinality
of w. Algorithmically, in the implementation of the method,
W is computed by forming the cross-product of the block-to-
cloud mappings contained in V .
All possible valid workflow deployments – as defined by
W – for the running example are shown in Figure 4. The
cloud on which a datum or service is deployed is indicated as
a superscript; e.g. daj is datum j deployed on cloud a.
A. Transferring Data between Clouds
There is still an important issue to be addressed: the
approach makes assumptions that are unrealistic for a practical
distributed workflow system. It assumes that:
1) a service can generate as its output a datum directly on
another cloud, without that item being first stored on the
same cloud as the service
2) a service can consume as its input a datum directly from
another cloud, without that item ever being stored on the
same cloud as the service
This problem is solved in two stages. Firstly, a new type
of service is introduced – sxfer – which will transfer data
from one cloud to another (this is analogous to the exchange
operator used in distributed query processing [5]). It would
be implemented with sub-components running on the source
and destination clouds. The sxfer service takes a datum on
one cloud and creates a copy on another. All the workflows
generated by W are then transformed to insert the transfer
nodes whenever there is a inter-cloud edge in the workflow
graph. There are four rules for transforming the graph:
daj → sai ⇒ daj → sai (12)
daj → sbi ⇒ daj → sxfer → dbj → sbi (13)
sai → daj ⇒ sai → daj (14)
sai → dbj ⇒ sai → daj → sxfer → dbj (15)
Transforms (12) and (14) reflect the fact that if both nodes
are deployed on the same cloud then no change is needed. In
d10 → s01 → d02 → s03 → d04
d10 → s01 → d02 → s03 → d14
d10 → s01 → d12 → s03 → d04
d10 → s01 → d12 → s03 → d14
d10 → s01 → d02 → s13 → d04
d10 → s01 → d02 → s13 → d14
d10 → s01 → d12 → s13 → d04
d10 → s01 → d12 → s13 → d14
d10 → s11 → d02 → s03 → d04
d10 → s11 → d02 → s03 → d14
d10 → s11 → d12 → s03 → d04
d10 → s11 → d12 → s03 → d14
d10 → s11 → d02 → s13 → d04
d10 → s11 → d02 → s13 → d14
d10 → s11 → d12 → s13 → d04
d10 → s11 → d12 → s13 → d14
Fig. 4. All valid workflows produced by mapping blocks to clouds
contrast, (13) and (15) introduce new sxfer nodes to transfer
data between clouds.
Unfortunately, the creation of new copies of data through
rules (13) and (15) introduces potential security problems.
When rule (13) is applied, there is the need to check that cloud
b has a sufficiently high security level to store the copy of dj
that would be created on it (the copy inherits the security level
of the original). The following rule must therefore be checked
to ensure this is true:
l(pb) ≥ l(dj) (16)
Similarly, for rule 15:
l(pa) ≥ l(dj) (17)
If either is violated then the workflow does not meet the
security requirements, and so should be removed from the set
W of valid mappings of services and data to clouds. Proof
that this violation can only occur in two specific cases now
follows.
Firstly, consider (16). By rule (2) we have:
c(sbi ) ≥ l(sbi ) (18)
Fig. 5. The relationship between security levels after transformation for
inter-cloud data transfer
First consider the case where:
c(sbi ) = l(s
b
i ) (19)
i.e. the clearance of the object is equal to its location.
Rules (3) and (4) give
c(sbi ) ≥ l(dj) (20)
and
l(pb) ≥ l(sbi ) (21)
then, by (19)
l(pb) ≥ l(sbi ) ≥ l(dj)⇒ l(pb) ≥ l(dj) (22)
and rule (16) is satisfied. Therefore, in this case there are
no violations.
However, if:
c(sbi ) > l(s
b
i ) (23)
i.e. the clearance of the service is strictly greater than its
location then combining (23) with (3) and (4) in a similar way
to the above, we get:
l(sbi ) < c(s
b
i ) ≥ l(dj) (24)
and
l(pb) ≤ l(sbi ) < c(sbi ) (25)
so it is possible that
l(pb) < l(dj) (26)
in which case rule (16) is violated and so that particular
workflow deployment does not meet the security requirements.
Turning now to the data produced by services, rule (17)
can be violated by transformation (15) in the case where the
service s0 writes up data (4) to a level such that:
l(pa) < l(dj)
The effect of the transformation rules is to modify the
security lattice of Figure 2 to that of Figure 5. The arc from
l(pb) to l(d0) is introduced by rule (13) which adds a copy
of d0 into the workflow, while the arc from l(pb) to l(d2) is
introduced by rule (15) which adds a copy of d2.
Applying the transformations to each workflow in Figure 4,
followed by rules (16) and (17) removes half of the possible
deployment options. Removing two duplicates created by the
transformations leaves the six valid options shown in Figure
6. Another view of the remaining options is shown in Figure
7; to illustrate the security levels, clouds, data and services at
level 0 are shown in red, while those at level 1 are shown in
yellow. These diagrams were generated automatically by the
tool we have built to implement the methods described in this
paper. The aim is to provide a security expert with an easy
to understand view of the possible options. Whilst a simple,
linear workflow has been used here to illustrate the method,
it is applicable to all workflows that can be represented by a
directed graph, whatever their structure.
This does however still leave open the issue of how to
choose between these valid options? The next section therefore
describes how a cost model (also implemented in the tool) can
be used to select the best option based on the charges made
by the cloud providers.
IV. SELECTING A DEPLOYMENT OPTION WITH A COST
MODEL
Once all valid options for allocating services and data
to clouds have been determined, one must be selected, and
used to enact the workflow. This decision could be made by
a deployment expert, but this section describes how it can
be achieved automatically through the use of a cost model.
Different criteria may be important for different applications
(e.g. dependability, performance), but this section illustrates
the approach by describing a model that minimizes price.
Cloud pricing is measured using the metrics by which cloud
providers allocate charges. For a cloud (p) this is represented
as:
• volume of data transferred into a cloud: epdxi
• volume of data transferred out of a cloud: epdxo
• volume of data stored, per unit of time for which it is
stored: epds
• time units of cpu consumed in the execution of a service:
epcpu
Cost metrics are characterised for a datum (d) as:
• data size: size(d)
• data longevity – the length of time the datum is stored:
longevity(d)
Finally, the cost metric for a service (s) is characterised as:
• time units of cpu consumed in the execution of a service:
cpu(s)
The cost model for a workflow execution can then be
defined as:
cost =
d=k−1∑
d=0
epds.size(d).longevity(d) +
s=m−1∑
s=0
epcpu.cpu(s) +
x=q−1∑
x=0
(epsdxo + e
pd
dxi).size(d)
Fig. 7. The six valid cloud mappings
where k is the number of data items in the workflow, and m
is the number of services, while q is the number of inter-cloud
data transfers. In the third term that calculates data transfer
costs, ps represents the source cloud and pd the destination
cloud for the transfer.
Using the cost model requires estimates of data sizes and
cpu costs. This is realistic for many workflows, and producing
these estimates is made easier if performance and capacity
are logged for each run, so allowing statistical analysis to
generate predictions. This is, for example, done by the e-
Science Central cloud platform [6] which logs data on all data
sizes, and service execution times.
Two examples now highlight the use of the model. Consider
d10 → s11 → d12 → sxfer → d02 → s03 → d04
d10 → s11 → d12 → sxfer → d02 → s03 → d04 → sxfer → d14
d10 → s11 → d12 → sxfer → d02 → sxfer → d12 → s13 → d14 → sxfer → d04
d10 → s11 → d12 → sxfer → d02 → sxfer → d12 → s13 → d14
d10 → s11 → d12 → s13 → d14 → sxfer → d04
d10 → s11 → d12 → s13 → d14
Fig. 6. The Workflows that remain valid after Transfer Blocks are Added
Cloud Storage Transfer In Transfer Out CPU
(GB / Month) (/GB) (/GB) (/s)
c0 10 10 10 10
c1 10 10 10 10
TABLE III
CLOUD COSTS: EXAMPLE 1
Block Size Longevity CPU
(GB) (months) (s)
d0 10 12
s1 100
d2 5 0
s3 50
d4 1 12
TABLE IV
BLOCK INFO
the valid mapping options shown in Figure 7 for the running
example. In the simplest case, if the performance and cost of
both clouds are equal (as in Table III), then the cost difference
between options is dependent only on the number of inter-
cloud communications. Table IV gives example values for the
blocks in the workflow. The size of d0 will be known as it
is the input to the workflow, while that for d2 and d4 are
estimates, perhaps based on the results of previous runs. To
set the longevity values, it is assumed that the input (d0) and
output data (d4) is stored for a year, while intermediate data
(d2) is immediately discarded once it has been consumed by
a service (s2).
Table V shows the results when the cost model is applied.
Each row represents the cost of an option in Figure 6. The final
column of the table gives the order of the options (from lowest
to highest cost). This confirms that the cheapest is option 6,
in which all the blocks are deployed on the same cloud, and
so there are no inter-cloud transfer costs.
While it may seem that an option in which all services
and data are deployed on a single cloud will always be the
cheapest, if CPU costs vary between clouds, then inter-cloud
Option Storage Transfer CPU Total Order
1 1320 100 1500 2920 3
2 1320 120 1500 2940 4
3 1320 220 1500 3040 6
4 1320 200 1500 3020 5
5 1320 20 1500 2840 2
6 1320 0 1500 2820 1
TABLE V
WORKFLOW DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS COSTS: EXAMPLE 1
Cloud Storage Transfer In Transfer Out CPU
(GB / Month) (/GB) (/GB) (/s)
c0 5 5 5 5
c1 10 5 5 10
TABLE VI
CLOUD COSTS: EXAMPLE 2
transfers may be worthwhile. Table VI shows clouds with a
different set of cost parameters. Here, a private cloud (c1) has
higher security, but higher CPU and data costs, compared to a
public cloud (c0). The effect of plugging these values into the
cost model is shown in Table VII. The result is that the best
option is now the one that allocates as much work as possible
to the public cloud, which has lower CPU costs.
V. RELATED WORK
The motivation for this paper came from the author’s
experience of cloud applications with security constraints (e.g.
Option Storage Transfer CPU Total Order
1 1260 75 1250 2585 1
2 1320 90 1250 2660 2
3 1260 165 1500 2925 5
4 1320 150 1500 2970 6
5 1260 15 1500 2775 3
6 1320 0 1500 2820 4
TABLE VII
WORKFLOW DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS COSTS: EXAMPLE 2
healthcare applications in the SiDE project [7]). However,
the general concern that security was a barrier to use of the
cloud for many organizations and applications has been widely
discussed [1]. The general issues associated with security and
clouds are discussed in [8]. A high-level approach to deciding
where an application could be deployed is discussed in [9].
Another approach to eliciting and exploiting information on
the security and other properties of clouds is described in
[10]. These methodologies could be valuable in assigning
security levels to clouds, services and data: something which
is orthogonal to the scheme described in this paper.
In [4], Bell-LaPadula is also applied to workflow security.
Petri Nets are used to model the workflow, rather than the rule-
based approach taken in this paper. However, its scope does
not extend to considering the deployment of blocks within a
workflow across a set of computational resources, as this paper
does.
There has been a large body of work on using cost models
to predict execution times in order to select between options
for deploying workflows over grids and clouds [11] [12].
However, perhaps due to the relatively recent introduction
of pay-as-you-go cloud computing, there is much less work
on using price-based cost models. In [13], both execution
time and price-based models are used to compare a set of
options for allocating a workflow over local resources and a
public cloud. The work in [14] uses non-linear programming
to generate options for using clouds to execute a workflow.
Security is not a consideration in any of these papers. Once
the partitioning of a workflow over a set of clouds has been
decided, a distributed workflow enactment engine is needed to
actually run the workflow. The issues around this are discussed
in [15] and a solution is proposed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has described a new method for automatically
determining valid options for partitioning a workflow of
services and data across a set of clouds based on security
requirements. A cost model is then used to choose between the
available options. The main contribution is to show how multi-
level security, which has previously been applied to workflows,
can be extended to encompass the allocation of workflow
services and data to clouds. This has demonstrated that the
need for inter-cloud data transfers raises interesting potential
security violations that need to be addressed; in the running
example, this ruled out over half of the possible partitioning
options. Although the paper focuses on workflows, the method
can be applied to other distributed systems whose components
are to be partitioned over a set of clouds.
A tool has been developed that implements the methods
shown in this paper; all the results for the running example
were produced by the tool. It is implemented in Haskell [16],
with the workflows represented as directed graphs, which are
processed in two ways. Rules (e.g. basic Bell-LaPadula and
the extension to clouds) are implemented as filter functions
which remove invalid workflows from the set of options.
Transformations (e.g. for inter-cloud transfers) take workflows
as input and generate the modified workflows. The tool also
automatically generates the diagrams that are shown in Figure
7 using the GraphViz software library [17]; these visualisations
have proved to be a useful way to review the available options.
The approach is currently being extended to encompass de-
pendability requirements. Even in its current form, the method
can illuminate dependability issues; for example, analysing the
set of valid options can highlight the level of dependency of the
workflow on particular clouds. If (as in the running example)
all valid partitioning options depend on the availability of a
specific cloud, then an organization which is dependent on
the workflow should ensure that this cloud has sufficiently
high levels of availability, or identify a second cloud with a
sufficiently high security clearance that could also be used by
the workflow.
Overall, our hope is that the approach described in this paper
can move the process of partitioning workflows over federated
clouds from one in which a human administrator makes an
informed but ad-hoc choice, to one in which a tool, such as
the one built to implement this method, can determine the
valid options based on a rigorous underlying set of rules, and
then suggest which is the best, based on a cost model. The
approach therefore has the advantage that it can reduce both
security violations and execution costs.
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